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Abstract
Introduction: Unhealthy diet is an important preventable risk factor for over-
weight and obesity. Identifying the key drivers of an unhealthy diet is an impor-
tant public health aim. “Big Food” has been identified as an influential factor
shaping dietary behavior and obesity, and their practices have broadly been
labeled as the “commercial determinants of obesity,” but there is a lack of defi-
nitions and conceptualizations for these terms. This review aimed to synthesize
literature on the commercial determinants of dietary behavior associated with
obesity. It presents the development of an integrative definition and a conceptual
framework involving potential influences on dietary behavior, and it examines the
prevalence of certain narratives within papers that focus on children and
adolescents.
Methods: Four electronic databases (Ovid MEDLINE, PubMed, Web of Science, and
Scopus) were searched up to December 2020. Eighty‐one articles met the inclusion
criteria: they were published in a peer‐reviewed academic journal, described a
practice from the food/beverage industry in relation to dietary behavior or obesity.
Data were integrated using critical interpretative synthesis.
Results: The commercial determinants of dietary behavior are conceptualized in
terms of three corporate spheres of action—political and legal; production, processing
and design; and marketing and preference shaping—which enable powerful food in-
dustry to successfully pursue their business, market, and political objectives. The
most frequently reported sphere of action targeting children and adolescents was
marketing and preference shaping.
Conclusions: In the included literature, the commercial determinants of dietary
behavior associated with obesity have been conceptualized as being part of a
complex system where corporate practices are enabled by power structures. The
proposed framework can facilitate a structured identification and systematic study
of the impact of specific aspects of food industry's strategies and increase
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opportunities for primary prevention by anticipating industry responses and by
discouraging corporate practices that harm health.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The global increase in obesity is associated with the increased
availability and consumption of energy‐dense, nutrient‐poor foods
and beverages, many of which are “ultra‐processed.”1–3 A key
contributing factor is the continuing expansion and concentration
of power of transnational food and beverage corporations (“Big
Food”/food industry).4,5 About 75% of the global food sales include
processed foods, for which the largest producers hold over a third
of the global market.6–8 This has led to an accelerated “nutrition
transition” from more traditional diets to highly processed
foods.9,10
Many authors have suggested that food industry practices have
shaped the eating environment and determined food choices11
through food availability, pricing, social, and cultural desirability.12–14
Factors related to the food system that promote obesogenic dietary
behaviors have broadly been labeled as the “commercial de-
terminants of obesity.”15,16
The term “commercial determinants of health” (CDoH) was first
used by West and Marteau,17 who defined it as: “Factors that infiu-
ence health which stem from the profit motive.” Millar proposed the
term “corporate determinants of health”18 to describe how com-
panies can act in ways that benefit society, but also how they can
have negative influences on population health. In 2016, Kisckbusch
et al.19 further defined the term as “strategies and approaches used
by the private sector to promote products and choices that are
detrimental to health” and conceptualized health outcomes as being
determined by the influence of corporate activities on the cultural
and social environments. In 2018, Madureira‐Lima and Galea pre-
sented20 and applied21 a framework to map corporate practices and
its impact on health, and conceptualized power as the vehicle
through which corporations exert their influence on preference
shaping and on the political, knowledge, legal, and extra‐legal
environments.
Although there is a developing discussion on the commercial
determinants as drivers of ill‐health, there has not been a compre-
hensive review that conceptualizes and defines these factors and the
ways in which they can directly and indirectly influence dietary
behavior and obesity.
Two systematic reviews22,23 and an overview24 of the CDoH
were recently published, showing that corporations use market (i.e.,
commodities themselves and production practices) and nonmarket
practices (e.g., extensive supply chains, corporate political activities)
to sell their products and secure a favorable regulatory environ-
ment,22,24 as well as that the role of commercial actors as drivers of
ill‐health are frequently obscured, understated or simply absent in
the existing frameworks of the determinants of health.23
The current systematic review extends the work in previous
reviews by addressing four specific, focused aims: (1) synthesize the
literature on the commercial determinants of dietary behavior
associated with obesity, (2) develop an integrative definition of this
concept, specific to the food and beverage industry, (3) develop a
conceptual framework of food industry activities that unintendedly
undermine nutrition globally, and (4) examine the prevalence of
certain narratives in the selected academic literature and within
papers that focus on children and adolescents.
2 | METHODS
The Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions25
guided the methodology for this review. Risk of bias was assessed
using Cullerton et al.'s26 key guiding principles for population health
researchers working with food industry. Principles from critical
interpretative synthesis (CIS) were used to guide the data synthesis27
and iteratively refine the research questions while searching and
selecting from the literature. CIS allows integrating and interpreting
a substantial body of data from different types of research evidence
and across multi‐disciplinary fields into a coherent conceptual
framework (“synthesising argument”), grounded in the concepts
identified in the included articles. The review protocol was registered
with PROSPERO, registration number CRD42019137363.
2.1 | Search strategy
Searches were developed between April and June 2019, and updated
in December 2020, to identify relevant literature published in peer‐
reviewed journals on the commercial determinants of dietary be-
haviors associated with obesity. Systematic searches were done in
the following databases: MEDLINE (Ovid), PubMed, Web of Science,
and Scopus from inception and with no restriction on date or country
of publication. Only documents written in English or Spanish were
included. Keyword searches included: [(commercial OR corporate).
mp AND (determinant*).mp)] AND [(food OR drink).mp AND (in-
dustry*.mp)] AND [(diet* behav* OR food choice* OR dietary intake
OR nutrition* OR eating behav*).mp] OR (obes* OR overweight OR
health).mp]. Database and reference search with results can be found
in Section 1 of the Supporting Information Data S1. In addition to
database searches, experts were asked for any other relevant
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documents for inclusion. Reference lists of included documents were
hand searched to find any additional eligible articles.
2.1.1 | Inclusion criteria
Articles had to fulfill the following criteria: published in a peer‐
reviewed journal (including commentary pieces), books or book sec-
tions; written in English or Spanish; refer to humans; propose a
definition, or describe a mechanism (e.g., influencing policymakers to
maintain a business‐friendly regulatory environment), framework, or
practices (e.g., lobbying) from the food and/or beverage industry that
relates to their commercial or corporate activities in relation to di-
etary behavior and/or its link with health or obesity; refer to food and
beverage industry exclusively.
2.2 | Article screening
Database searches were managed using EndNote X9 and screened
using Rayyan QCRI. One author (Y.C.U.) retrieved and screened titles
for eligibility. Y.C.U. and a second reviewer (P.H.) screened titles and
abstracts selected after the first title screening. Full text screening
was done independently by the two reviewers. Reasons for exclusion
were documented and discussed until agreement was reached.
2.3 | Data extraction
Data extraction was done by Y.C.U. and reviewed by Y.C.U., Z.T., R.J.,
and F.D.V. Data were extracted for author and year, article name,
publication type, country/region, income level, field of study, popu-
lation age group, mention of adolescents (10–19 years), health
outcome, definition or mechanism, conflict of interest reported, and
details for potential conflict of interest. To capture the whole range
of definitions, key terms, and mechanisms that have been used in the
academic literature, there was no restriction on age groups. Once the
final list of included articles was selected, a subgroup of articles was
created that focused on adolescence (10–19 years). For the purposes
of this review, if the article referred to “youth” or “young people”
without specifying age, they were considered to be ≤19 years old and
were included as part of the “adolescent” group to identify the
dominant narratives and most frequently mentioned practices tar-
geting this age group.
2.4 | Quality assessment and risk of bias
Risk of bias and other aspects of study quality were not assessed
since CIS recommends prioritizing relevant articles rather than
selecting study types.28 Conflicts of interest (CoI) reported by the
authors were documented, discussed, and explored using Cullerton
et al.'s guiding principles to help identify, prevent, and manage actual
or perceived CoI. Even if authors reported not to have any CoIs or
competing interests, these guiding principles still enabled critical
appraisal of potential CoIs. For example, reporting not having
competing interests but being employed by the food industry or by
an industry funded organization could influence study findings.29–32 If
any potential CoIs were identified, findings from the study were
critically appraised to identify if, for example, the study funding
source or collaboration with food industry could have influenced the
study results.
2.5 | Data synthesis
Guided by CIS27 principles, data synthesis covered the following
steps. Fragments of text that made reference to corporate activities
in relation to dietary behavior and obesity were extracted and coded
by the first author. A second researcher (Z.T.) independently double‐
coded thirty percent of the included articles, and any discrepancies
were discussed until agreement was reached. Codes that explained
similar ideas were iteratively grouped into themes and subthemes.
Based on the themes and subthemes, authors developed higher‐level
conceptual themes (data‐driven themes). The relationship between
the data‐driven themes, themes, and subthemes enabled the creation
of the conceptual framework showing how the commercial de-
terminants of diet and obesity operate.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Search results
A PRISMA flow diagram (Figure 1) documents the search, screening,
and selection process of the 81 included articles.
3.2 | Descriptive information
The largest number of identified studies focused on high income
countries (n = 37; 46%). The field of study was mainly focused on
public health (n = 51; 63%) and health policy (n = 17; 21%), followed
by nutrition (n = 3; 4%), law (n = 2; 2%), business (n = 2; 2%), an-
thropology (n = 1; 1%), and sociology (n = 1; 1%). Only 23 articles
(28%) referred to adolescents (10–19 years) with the majority
(n = 58; 72%) not specifying an age group. About half of the studies
(n = 38; 47%) focused on obesity, while 32 articles (40%) focused on
diet related noncommunicable diseases. Potential CoIs were found in
four articles (5%),33–36 but three of those took measures to explicitly
manage these,33,35,36 for example, limiting the involvement of the
funder in any aspects of the project33,36; explicitly reporting the
nature of funding received from the food industry33,35,36; and
including findings that were unfavorable to the funder.33,35,36 The
conclusion drawn from these studies was that there were no CoIs
since, even when being employed by the food industry or by an
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F I GUR E 1 PRISMA flow diagram
F I GUR E 2 Visual representation of the framework for the commercial determinants of dietary behaviors and obesity
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industry funded organization, the funding source or collaboration
with the food industry should not have had an influence on study
findings and results did not seem to enhance industry's reputation or
influence over the evidence base of diet and obesity. In contrast, in
one study34 the author was employed, and the study was funded, by
the food industry, but these were not reported as this being a po-
tential CoIs, and study findings and results seemed to only enhance
industry's reputation. A detailed table with descriptive information
on the 81 included articles and details on CoI can be found in Ta-
bles S2 and S3. Extracted quotes of definitions and mechanisms
found in the 81 articles included can be found in Table S4.
3.3 | A conceptual framework for the commercial
determinants of dietary behavior and obesity
Three data‐driven themes were developed and fell under the concept
of “food industry's spheres of action”: 1. political and legal; 2. pro-
duction, processing and design; and 3. marketing and preference shaping.
The framework was developed by expanding on these three data‐
driven themes and resulted in 12 themes (“corporate strategies”),
26 subthemes (“corporate practices”), and 85 mechanisms. A table
with details on the themes, subthemes, and mechanisms can be found
in Table S5. A visual representation of the framework (i.e., the rela-
tionship between themes and subthemes) is presented in Figure 2.
3.3.1 | Sphere of action 1: Political and legal
The political and legal sphere of action aims to generate a business‐
friendly regulatory and discursive environment. To achieve this,
corporations employ a range of strategies and practices. Four
corporate strategies (themes) and 10 practices (subthemes) were
identified.
Strategy 1.1: Framing evidence and debate
Through this strategy, the food industry aims to frame the evidence
and debate of diet and obesity as an issue of individual and societal
choices and responsibilities.37–40 This framing has the potential to shift
the focus away from dietary behavior (e.g., emphasizing physical ac-
tivity over diet and calorie intake on obesity) and limit the perception
that policymakers have on the food industry's responsibility for the
products they produce, promote, and sale, particularly ultra‐processed
foods which have been linked with excess calorie intake and weight
gain41. This strategy is enacted by shaping narrative and debate of
health and disease and through the creation of evidence.
Practice 1.1 (a): Shaping narrative and debate of health and disease.
This was a commonly reported practice which allowed food‐related
corporate interests to shift focus away from health and reframe
regulatory efforts (e.g., soft drink taxes) as an issue of consumer
rights and to highlight these efforts as a restriction to people's
freedom of choice.15,24,42–50
(…) food industry selectively produces and dissemi-
nates information that would be beneficial to its ac-
tivities, to infiuence public policies and public opinion
in ways favourable to its companies 48
Practice 1.1 (b): Creating evidence. By funding research, confer-
ences, creating evidence for obesity causes and solutions, industry
can create a body of literature and supportive narratives that
maintain doubt and detract attention from the health implications of
consumption of their products.40,45,51–53
The strategies (…) that unhealthy commodity in-
dustries use to promote their products and choices
that are detrimental to health (…) include influencing
the creation of evidence.54
Food industry tactics to influence policy: (…) creation
or funding of alliances or front groups; funding
research to create or maintain doubt about health
implications.55
Strategy 1.2: Influencing governance of food production, trade, and
investment
Global food industry firms benefit from, and aim to maintain, a
global liberalized trading environment where their corporate and
economic power can shape the landscape of the food environment
and nutrition worldwide and limit the effectiveness of traditional
governance mechanisms.56 This is made possible by participating in
foreign direct investment (FDI) practices, by taking advantage of
neoliberal economic policies that favor trade liberalization and
globalization, and through benefiting from agricultural export
subsidies.
Practice 1.2 (a): Participating in foreign direct investments (FDIs).
Corporate economic and political power allows the global food in-
dustry to have unrestricted capital flows in emerging markets, grow
through mergers, and joint ventures. This allows them to have an
increased control over different levels of the food system (produc-
tion, processing, distribution, retail).20,55,57–60
Transnational food companies powerfully shape the
supply, demand, and consumption of food and
beverage products. (...) Transnational food companies
are moving quickly into markets in developing coun-
tries, using strategies such as foreign direct investment
to increase production and sales.58
Practice 1.2 (b): Taking advantage of neoliberal economic policies.
Neoliberal policies that enable the opening of trading markets have
allowed a widespread distribution of commodities that are conducive
to the production and distribution of ultra‐processed foods and
sugary beverages.22,59–61
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(…) neoliberalism, an ideology that favors deregulation,
privatization, and the supremacy of markets, has
strengthened the power of corporations and weak-
ened the role of government in public health
regulation.62
Practice 1.2 (c): “Revolving doors” between regulatory agencies & food
and agriculture industries. There are national agencies whose remit
includes setting the governance rules of food production, trade, and
investment. Officials from these regulatory agencies are sometimes
recruited from food industry and agribusinesses (or vice versa), and
in some cases then move on to become lobbyists in favor of the food
industry interests.5 This becomes a “revolving door” between public
and private sectors that gives key access to decision makers and
valuable knowledge and relationships that allows them to shape
governance systems.5,21,39,63–65
There is a long history of USDA leaders and leaders of
other agencies being recruited from food and agricul-
ture industries and then returning to businesses like
lobbying firms when their government service ends.5
Strategy 1.3: Influencing policymaking process
Influencing the policymaking process was the most frequently
mentioned strategy.22,35,38,39,42,43,45,46,50,51,56,63,65–72 Food industry
have been able to influence policy and governance through market
dominance, which has given them power to influence policy agendas.
Within this strategy, four corporate practices were identified.
Practice 1.3 (a): Lobbying. Lobbying was the most reported prac-
tice within influencing the policymaking process strat-
egy.18,35,42,48,51,52,62,63,71,73–75 Shaping the regulatory environment is
critical to corporate profits52 and lobbying was identified as a prac-
tice through which corporations exert their power to maintain a
business‐friendly regulatory environment.19,20,24,62,65
Through lobbying (…) they [“Big Food”] have directly
sought to infiuence policy and governance.63
Practice 1.3 (b) Constituency building. Through constituency
building, food industry seeks to get involved in the community,
establish relationships with key stakeholders and highlight media and
public opinion that support industry's position.45,65,68 This practice
includes philanthropic activities, promoting public–private partner-
ships and public relationships to recruit supporters and detract
opposition.50,65,68
Constituency building… attempts to infiuence public
opinion and public policies and programmes.48
Practice 1.3 (c): Funding key stakeholders/opinion leaders. Giving
financial incentives to key stakeholders and opinion leaders (e.g.,
election campaigns, health and nutrition organizations, opposition
groups) creates a supportive environment for food industry activities
and helps to maintain a business‐friendly regulatory
environment.36,39,51,76
“(…) corporations penetrate all aspects of society, from
macrosocial and political aspects, such as corporate
donations to election campaigns.”21
Practice 1.3 (d): Intimidating opposition. By intimidating opponents,
the food industry aims to disrupt activities that have the potential to
negatively impact on their business. These activities include posing
legal threats against public policies and industry opponents,45
intimidating scientists by creating doubt about their integrity and
their work35 and by using media leverage to criticize public health
advocates.31
Food industry threatened to litigate against potential
government policy through legal channels (…) industry
aimed to intimidate policy makers by citing potential
barriers to free trade if such policy was introduced.45
Strategy 1.4: Limiting corporate liability
By limiting their corporate liability, the food industry can limit the
extent to which they can be held accountable for their activities
which are harmful to health.56,67,77,78
Practice 1.4 (a): Externalizing costs. The food industry has imple-
mented practices to externalize costs using unregulated areas of
activity, such as keeping prices artificially low by outsourcing sectors
of their business79 and shifting profits to tax havens.24,73 These
corporations have the power to keep the price of harmful products
artificially low with the final price not reflecting the full true cost of
production and the costs of the damage caused by the consumption
of their products.80
(…) there is externalization of costs to the public from
profit‐shifting, tax‐havens, and service fees paid back
to USA headquarters. (…) The health costs of non‐
communicable diseases and environmental impacts
from McDonald's operations are externalized to the
community.73
3.3.2 | Sphere of action 2: Production, processing,
and design
The production, processing, and design corporate sphere of action
aims to optimize cost viability. To achieve this, corporations employ
two corporate strategies (themes) and five practices (subthemes).
Strategy 2.1: Reducing processing/manufacturing costs
The food industry can reduce production costs using optimization
practices (e.g., mass production and economies of scale),64,73,79,81–84
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reformulating and manufacturing products with low‐cost ingredients
that enhance palatability (e.g., fat, sugar, salt, caffeine).57,59,67,85,86
Practice 2.1 (a): Optimizing food manufacture and processing.
Technological advancement and the usage of economies of scale has
enabled massive manufacturing and processing of energy‐dense/low
nutritional value foods.80,87,88 These foods are highly palatable,
attractive to the consumer due to their convenience for purchase,
and consumption and cheaper to produce.81,84
Large food, beverage (…) firms are among the most
internationalised businesses in the entire economy. (…)
Economies of scale are an important factor in the
profitability of food, wholesale, retail, and beverage
firms (…).87
Practice 2.1 (b): Reformulating. Reformulating products can serve
two purposes; (1) increase the ratio of cheap ingredients to reduce
production and processing costs and (2) serve the discursive purpose
that industry, is part of the solution.57
Changing product recipes may be good brand protec-
tion but has little population dietary impact (…). They
favor a technical approach to nutrition to justify the
products they produce and sell.57
Practice 2.1 (c): Increasing product appeal with low‐cost ingredients.
Products high in fat, sugar and/or salt have a high sensory appeal,
increase shelf‐life, and by being cheap, generate large profit margins,
especially with high‐volume sales. These ingredients are commonly
used in high proportions to manufacture energy‐dense and ultra‐
processed foods.35,89
“Obesogenic” food companies maximize their profits
by maintaining or increasing sales and prioritizing both
types of addictive mechanism (e.g. “value deals” and
addictive properties of sugar, salt, fat and caffeine on
foods).86
Strategy 2.2: Increasing market share
Increasing food industry's market share is both an outcome and a
driver for commercial profit‐making strategies and practices.
Increased corporate growth due to sales and profit‐margins increases
corporate power which allows continued market penetration in
emerging markets and enables them to take advantage of cheaper
production costs while continuously optimizing their production and
processing costs.24,62,65,74,90–92
Practice 2.2 (a): Strengthening penetration in emerging markets. By
extending their corporate dominion, food industry has become richer
and more powerful.90 Penetrating emerging markets has been a key
practice used to continue growing and expanding their business
strategies (e.g., diversifying their product portfolio) and design
products according to local offering of ingredients and demand (e.g.,
glocalisation).54,58,84
(…) low‐ and middle‐income countries, have been
identified as emerging markets for Big Food.37
Breadth and depth of corporate influence is expanded
as more people are reached with ever more con-
sumption choices.19
Practice 2.2 (b): Taking advantage of cheaper production costs in
emerging markets. Having access to a variety of markets allows cor-
porations to decide where to establish their manufacturing plants
and where to get their supply of ingredients from (e.g., bulk buying of
local commodities at lower prices and settling production and pro-
cessing plants in places where labor costs are cheaper).59,60,86
(…) the economic causes of under‐nutrition and over‐
weight have a common structural basis, driven by
multinational corporations' demand for cheap labour
and new consumers.86
Strategy 2.3: Agribusiness food/ingredient supply
The food value chain begins with the production input (i.e., materials
for crop production and seeds), followed by farmers, growers, and
agribusinesses that provide raw agricultural commodities. Therefore,
the nutritional quality of the food environment is strongly influenced
by the ingredients that the food and beverage industry use to
manufacture their products.69 Additionally, which and how much of
these ingredients are produced is determined by regulations and
targets set for agricultural production, economic performance, and
competitiveness for agribusinesses.5,21,46,63,64,69,80,81,93
Practice 2.3 (a): Benefiting from agricultural subsidies. Agricultural
export subsidies have encouraged conversion of traditional domestic
production to export‐oriented production60 or cash‐crops and have
prioritized commodities with highly profitable by‐products (e.g., corn,
soybean).55,71,79
“...dietary shift is also attributed to the continued
agricultural export subsidies that allow developed
countries to artificially suppress food prices making it
difficult for domestic markets in developing countries
to complete.”55
Practice 2.3 (b): Prioritizing commodities with profitable by‐products
(e.g., corn, soybean)1. Food and beverage industry use ingredients that
will maintain the essential composition of their products, but equally,
keep their processing costs within their budget and keep prices
stable at retail point. Simultaneously, governments set regulations for
commodity production and economic performance to maintain pro-
duction at competitive market level,69 which becomes an incentive to
1
Note: For example: corn by‐products include flour, starch, oil, high fructose corn syrup,
ethanol, livestock feed; soybean by‐products include: soybean hulls, meal, flour, oil, lecithin,
livestock feed.
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prioritize the production of commodities with higher productivity and
that will generate higher profits.79 Such is the case of soybeans and
corn.94 With increased productivity, the price of these commodities
reduces.79 Although this can increase farmers' profits momentarily,
eventually, this surplus will result in a reduction in prices. This has
two effects: first, food industry can have continuous access to cheap
ingredients, making food manufacturers prioritize these ingredients
over others; and second, the need to find new applications for corn,
soy, and their by‐products. Today, most ultra‐processed food con-
tains some form of corn or soy.94
…the low cost of high calorie foods with little nutri-
tional value is due, in part, to federal subsidies for
production of corn and soybeans.79
3.3.3 | Sphere of action 3: Marketing and preference
shaping
The marketing and preference shaping corporate sphere of action
aims to increase brand loyalty and enhance consumers' desire for
their product. To achieve this, five corporate strategies (themes) and
nine practices (subthemes) were identified.
Strategy 3.1: Promotion to increase brand awareness and visibility
To increase sales of their products, food industry needs to increase
brand awareness and visibility in targeted populations.68,81 This can
be achieved through various channels and strategies including inte-
grated marketing and advertising73,88; corporate social responsibility
(CSR),68 sponsorship, and branding18,73,95; and by creating public‐
partnerships with key stakeholders, opinion leaders, and influential
people that will promote their brand enabling wide visibility and
reach.15,36,54,63
Practice 3.1 (a): Advertising. With technology improvement adver-
tising has become more specialized and sophisticated, and is one of the
main and most frequently reported practice food industry has used to
attract new consumers, particularly young people, to encourage con-
sumption of their products.18,21,22,24,33,36,46,58,67,73,74,84–86,88,96,97
[The] food environment and exposure to childhood
advertising are important causes of childhood obesity
(…).67
Practice 3.1 (b): CSR, sponsorship, and branding. This was the most
frequently mentioned practice to increase brand awareness and
visibility.16,18,36,52,68,73,78,95,96,98 Through this set of strategies, cor-
porations attempt to obscure the boundary between profit‐making
and philanthropic activities.39
CSR as primarily a public relations strategy designed to
achieve ‘‘innocence by association’’ (…) soda industry
CSR aims to position the companies, and their
products, as socially acceptable rather than contrib-
uting to a social ill.95
Practice 3.1 (c): Creating partnerships. The food industry advocates
to create partnerships with government (e.g., public–private part-
nerships) highlighting that these can create unique opportunities to
leverage effective and more wide‐reaching interventions.24,69 How-
ever, it is unclear how public interests can be protected and priori-
tized over commercial interests.
Some critics warn that any partnership creates benefit
for industry but see no clear, established or legitimate
mechanism through which public health would be
protected.15
Strategy 3.2: Influencing consumers' perceptions of products
Food industry aims to influence consumers behavioral motiva-
tions.86 Resulting patterns of consumption are influenced by con-
sumers' perception of products, beyond the product itself, and can
be heavily influenced by commercial companies, involving devel-
oping a brand image that is linked to emotional triggers and
convenience.68,85,86
Practice 3.2 (a): Packaging products with “added value” claims.
Focusing on a particular nutrient and labeling it as an “added value”
health claim, generating brand differentiation to distinguish one line
of products from another, and adding toys and appealing characters
can elicit consumers desire for these products.
Health claims allow for a description of the relation-
ship between a food product and its role in disease
prevention. Food labelling is a significant marketing
tool because of its impact on consumer confidence in
food quality and the role it plays in the general
discourse of diet and health 52
Strategy 3.3: Creating brand loyalty
Creating brand loyalty is key for the food industry to ensure con-
sumers consistently purchase their products,46,85,93 and they are
particularly interested in forging long‐lasting relations with children
and adolescents to ensure brand loyalty.85
Practice 3.3 (a): Pouring rights. A reported practice identified was
pouring rights contracts in schools and sports stadiums.93,99,100 This
practice involves acquiring exclusive permission for a beverage
manufacturer or bottler to control distribution and sales in a venue.
(…) exclusive rights to sell one brand are the latest
development in the increasing commercialization of
school food. These contracts, intended to elicit brand
loyalty among young children who have a lifetime of
purchases ahead of them.93
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Practice 3.3 (b) Commercializing education. Schools have been used
as a marketing venue for the food industry since they can acquire
access to a captive audience of young consumers.18,85,93,97,99 This
includes, for example, corporate creation/sponsorship of curriculum
and educational materials,99 appropriation of space by sponsoring
infrastructure in exchange for branding sports facilities, lunchrooms,
or scoreboards.97
[A] trend is the intensified focus on schools as mar-
keting venues for corporations (…), including salty
snacks, fat‐laden foods, and sugary soft drinks.99
Strategy 3.4: Product placement and distribution
Food industry has benefited from neoliberal policies and have
managed to attain global presence by making use of extended supply
chains and distribution channels, and by making ultra‐processed
foods increasingly available, accessible, and convenient for con-
sumption worldwide. This was a commonly reported strat-
egy.16,24,54,59,74,82–84,91,101
Practice 3.4 (a): Ubiquitous presence of ultra‐processed foods. Ultra‐
processed foods can be found almost everywhere at any time in ur-
ban and in high‐ and middle‐income countries.74 This combined with
industry's marketing practices contributes to excessive consumption
of ultra‐processed foods.33,62,74,80,89
The combination of high levels of promotion, wide-
spread availability and low prices of these products (...)
overwhelmingly drive the behaviours in the direction
of positive energy balance.80
Strategy 3.5: Pricing
Corporations also shape our environments by establishing the pricing
strategies for their products, for example, cheap selling price at point
of purchase,24,84 discounts, bundle deals, price promotions, and
coupons and reward programs.16,62,73–75,81 Consumption patterns
are strongly dependent on price.102
Practice 3.5 (a): Cheap selling price. One factor that influences the
consumption of ultra‐processed foods is their cheap selling
price.58,80,86,103
Transnational food companies (…) are one of the main
drivers of the increasing consumption of ultra‐
processed foods and sugary beverages, which are
cheap, highly palatable, and sold in large portion
sizes.55
Practice 3.5 (b): Price promotions. Price promotions influence
consumer's purchasing behavior by delivering more product for the
same amount of money, in turn influencing consumer's purchasing
preference.54,79,86,93,97,103
Food and beverage marketers' and fast‐food restau-
rants' ongoing marketing and sales promotion efforts,
such as value pricing, psychological pricing, quantity
discounts, and combo deals, which undermine portion
control and healthy food choices.79
3.4 | Commercial determinants of dietary behavior
and obesity in children/adolescents
Only 23 of the 81 (28%) articles mentioned anything specific for chil-
dren/adolescents (≤19 years). There was not a single study focusing on
adolescents10–19 exclusively. Most of the commercial determinants of
dietary behavior and obesity in children/adolescents are similar
compared to the ones for all age groups. However, some aspects are
mentioned more frequently, while some others are not mentioned at
all, when referring to this age group. The most frequently mentioned
corporate strategies for children/adolescents were within the mar-
keting and preference shaping sphere of action, namely, advertising
through targeted and integrated marketing22,24,33,36,46,58,67,73,84–
86,88,97 and CSR, sponsorship and branding of sports, cultural events, and
educational materials.22,24,36,68,73,91,93,95,100,101 The second most re-
ported sphere of action was production, processing, and design, in
particular, increasing product appeal through low‐cost/addictive
ingredients.
3.5 | Development of an integrative definition for
the commercial determinants of dietary behavior
associated with obesity
The inductive process of merging overlapping concepts across the
included articles allowed to make broader analytic statements about
how the commercial determinants of dietary behavior and obesity
operate. The patters of meaning and the relationships found between
the themes and subthemes allowed for the creation of an integrative
definition for the commercial determinants of dietary behavior
associated with obesity. The following two‐part definition is there-
fore proposed:
The commercial determinants of dietary behaviour and
obesity are strategies used by the food industry to
create a favourable regulatory and discursive environ-
ment in which they can produce, promote and increase
sales of their products to maximise profits and generate
continued shareholder value; these strategies are
operationalised by the food industry through 3 spheres
of action: political and legal; production, processing and
design; and marketing and preference shaping.
The commercial determinants of dietary behavior and how
they are operationalized (i.e., the three spheres of action) are
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conceptualized as being dynamic (changing over time), systemic
(part of an interconnected web of actors), and targeting different
levels in the system. The three spheres of action are underpinned
by specific aims and target different levels in the system (see
Table 1):
4 | DISCUSSION
An integrative conceptualization of the commercial determinants
of dietary behavior associated with obesity has been developed
using principles from CIS.27 Findings suggest that dietary behavior
associated with obesity is influenced by three spheres of action
within corporations: political and legal; production, processing, and
design; and marketing and preference shaping. These spheres of ac-
tion build the structure of a system that influence and are influ-
enced by different levels—the macro‐level (e.g., political and
economic systems), meso‐level (e.g., research communities, socio-
cultural norms), and micro‐level (e.g., consumers). The political and
legal sphere of action was the most frequently mentioned, followed
by marketing and preference shaping and production, processing, and
design. This highlights that research has mainly focused on how
and what strategies have been developed to influence and shape
the regulatory environment through the political and legal sphere of
action. Within this sphere, the most reported corporate strategies
were influencing policymaking processes through lobbying; influencing
governance of food production, trade, and investment by taking
advantage of neoliberal economic policies; and framing the evidence
and debate by shaping the narrative of health and disease. In
contrast, marketing and preference shaping was the most reported
sphere of action in children/adolescence, which is a more proximal
influence than political and legal sphere of action. This result aligns
with the findings from Kelly et al.104 which proposes a conceptual
pathway of effects of how marketing ultimately influences
individual‐level weight outcomes. Although this review does not
propose a logical sequence of effects linking marketing and pref-
erence shaping to weight status, the presented results enlist the
specific practices food industry employs (i.e., advertising, sponsor-
ship, sale promotions) that increase brand loyalty and enhance
consumers' desire for their products which penetrates cultural and
social norms as proposed by Cairns.13
Four articles were found to have potential CoIs,33–36 but only
one article did not provide evidence of any steps taken to mitigate
against potential CoIs.34 This study gave a strong positive view on the
food industry being part of the solution to obesity by focusing only on
physical activity and undermining the role of processed food intake
on obesity.
The current results are aligned to other frameworks found in
the literature which focus on governance structures and corporate
political activity of the food industry, with respect to public
health.15,56,65,105,106 However, this review identified two additional
spheres of corporation action, namely, production, processing and
design, and marketing and preference shaping, which have different
aims and mechanisms of action than the ones for corporate
political activity.107 Two previous impact assessment frame-
works73,108 have highlighted that health impacts resulting from the
actions of transnational corporations should be assessed not only
according to their political practices, but also according to their
business strategies. This review includes specific business and
marketing practices from the food and beverage industry which
are crucial in understanding the strategies employed to influence
the food environment, dietary behavior, and obesity. Focusing only
on corporate political activities would overshadow other important
drivers and miss an opportunity to unpack the different levels
of impact beyond influencing a business‐friendly regulatory
environment.
There was overlap between some themes and subthemes in the
proposed framework showing that some strategies and practices
could also be categorized as part of other spheres of action. For
example, CSR has been theorized to be part of corporate political
activities to advance corporations' interests in terms of regulation 65;
however, CSR can also be seen as part of a marketing strategy to
raise brand awareness in targeted populations.68 Equally, product
reformulation is part of the production, processing, and design sphere
TAB L E 1 Aims and levels of influence of the three spheres of action
Sphere of action Aim Levels of influence—examples
(1) Political and legal Generate a business‐friendly regulatory and
discursive environment
Macro—political and legal systems
Meso—regulatory agencies, political parties, research and public
health organizations, NGOs




Optimize processing and cost viability of their
products
Macro—globalized market economies, emerging markets
Meso—local organizations, manufacturing communities
(3) Marketing and prefer-
ence shaping
Increase brand loyalty and enhance consumers'
desire for their products
Meso—culture, social norms, consumer communities and groups,
philanthropic communities, schools, sport venues
Micro—individual consumers (e.g., children and adolescents)
Abbreviation: NGO, non‐governmental organization.
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of action, but reformulation can also be used to shape narrative and
debate on health and disease. Identifying these overlapping themes
enables evaluating factors with an impact on multiple and different
parts of the food system that influence dietary behavior and obesity.
While this article focused on the determinants of overnutrition
(i.e., obesity), it is important to acknowledge that the economic
causes of under and overnutrition could have a common structural
basis, potentially driven by large corporations in demand for both,
cheap labor and new consumers.
A major strength of this review is that it provides an integrative
definition to describe the commercial determinants of dietary behavior
and obesity and offers a conceptual framework to systematically study
and identify how food industry's strategies and practices are oper-
ationalized to shape and influence dietary behaviors, and obesity at
population level. The provided framework should be considered a
conceptual starting point for future research and intervention devel-
opment. In addition, this review puts commercial influences “back in
the picture” by focusing explicitly and systematically on the commer-
cial determinants of obesity, as suggested by Maani et al.23
A limitation of this study is that gray literature is not included.
Additionally, inclusion criteria restricted articles to those written in
English and Spanish. The search strategy retrieved articles that
included the concept of commercial/corporate determinants, and
therefore, articles using different terminology may have been
excluded. Physical activity‐related literature was purposively left out
since the focus of this review was on dietary behavior but might have
revealed additional determinants.
The findings in this review highlight the political and legal and the
marketing and preference shaping spheres of action as most frequently
mentioned in the overall framework. However, this may reflect other
relevant parts of the corporate sphere (production, processing, and
design) being under‐theorized in the literature included in this review,
potentially because of the distal effect these activities have on health
outcomes.
The frequency of mention of a themes or subthemes was not
assessed as an indicative of a sphere of action or strategy's impor-
tance or the size of its impact in the overall food system. It does not
necessarily reflect the strength of the evidence but may reflect the
attractiveness of the topic for researchers and funding, the different
specialized fields, or difficulties in accessing data.
Data analysis and thus the definition and framework proposed
incorporated expert‐opinion pieces and arguments supported by
research data. A limitation of this approach is that the veracity of
statements in commentary pieces could not be tested. However,
expert‐opinion pieces can provide valuable insight into issues of
broad concern in global health, particularly those concerning policy
issues.109 Nonetheless, the sections in the framework that are
dominated by opinion‐based arguments should be tested empirically
to make this framework fully evidence‐based.
Future work should further explore the identified strategies and
develop an in‐depth understanding of the mechanisms in the pro-
posed framework by testing the level of impact of each strategy and
translate and use these finding in the design of interventions. From a
systems‐thinking perspective, this framework can be used to start
exploring feedback loops, facilitate identifying and monitoring how
the food system and dietary behavior patterns adapt over time, and
anticipate industry reactions to regulation measures. Additionally,
this framework can be used to highlight what is included and what
has been left out in research or policymaking efforts.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This review provides a conceptual framework and an integrative
definition of the commercial determinants of dietary behavior asso-
ciated with obesity, specific to the food and beverage industry. The
framework can enable a structured identification and systematic
study of the impact of specific aspects of commercial strategies on
the food environment, eating behavior, and obesity. It has the po-
tential to be used in practice, policy, and research to identify levers
for change in obesity prevention strategies, guide the development of
health policies, and increase opportunities for primary prevention by
anticipating industry responses and by discouraging corporate prac-
tices that harm health.
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